Science has always been a double-edged sword – creating knowledge that can contribute both to the advancement of humanity and to its destruction. Nuclear weapons are perhaps the clearest example. The United States announced its emergence as the pre-eminent status in the post-war international order when, on August 6 and 9, 1945, it dropped two nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and killed more than 200,000 Japanese citizens. This brought an end to World War II
Power always begets another countervailing power. Consequently, soon after 1945, several major powers entered a race to acquire nuclear weapons. Mutual destruction capability is the best insurance against a nuclear attack by another country. From a different perspective, nuclear power can also become a strategic energy asset for economic stability, energy independence, and climate management. Nevertheless, doubts persist about whether the pursuit of a civilian nuclear program could eventually become the first step towards developing nuclear weapons. Recognizing this ambiguity, the international community adopted the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968. Although the treaty eventually received the support of most countries, critics have described it as a flawed “grand bargain.” In their view, while the treaty sought to prevent additional states from acquiring nuclear weapons, it did not impose an immediate prohibition on the vertical proliferation, expansion, or modernization of the arsenals already possessed by nuclear-armed states, since vertical proliferation and modernization by those states were treated as secondary concerns.
The present war involving Iran and the United States has brought this fundamental ambiguity into sharp focus. Without entering into a debate about the merits of the opposing parties’ positions, we wish to examine two sharply different predictions concerning the future direction of the war.
The first prediction is that there is a significant possibility that the United States might use a low-yield nuclear weapon against Iran. Proponents of this view invoke the concept of a tactical nuclear battlefield weapon. In simple terms, a tactical nuclear weapon is a relatively low-yield nuclear device intended for use against specific military targets—such as troops, vehicles, artillery positions, airfields, or command centers—rather than against major cities or strategic targets deep inside an adversary’s territory. Aircraft, short-range missiles, or artillery systems may deliver such weapons. Their explosive yields can vary considerably and, in some cases, may overlap with those of weapons classified as strategic.
The United States used a 15-kiloton nuclear bomb on Hiroshima, a weapon that falls into the category of “strategic nuclear weapons,” which are designed to strike major enemy targets deep within their homeland. Thousands of innocent civilians can be killed by a single such nuclear bomb. The primary targets of tactical nuclear weapons are enemy troops, artillery, and command posts on the frontlines of a war. These weapons operate at short range and are delivered by artillery, fighter-bombers, or short-range missiles. Their yield, or explosive power, can range from 0.1 kiloton to 50 kilotons.
The first prediction is that there is a significant probability of a limited nuclear bombing by the United States on Iran. The protagonists of this view invokes the concept “Tactical Nuclear Battlefield Weapon”. Wikipedia gives the simplest explanation of this term.
A tactical nuclear weapon is a small, low-yield nuclear device designed for use on a military battlefield to destroy specific enemy troops, vehicles, or bases rather than whole cities.
The United States used a 15 Kiloton nuclear bomb on Hiroshima, which falls in the category called “Strategic Nuclear Bomb” which is designed to strike major enemy targets deep within their homeland. Thousands of innocent citizens can succumb to one such nuclear bomb. The primary target of Tactical Nuclear Weapons is enemy troops, artillery, and command posts on the frontlines of the war. It works at a short range, delivered by artillery, fighter-bombers, or short-range missiles. Its yield or explosive power can range from 0.1 Kiloton to 50 Kiloton.
In a very recent speech, US President Donald Trump claimed that the Strait of Hormuz, off the coast of Iran, is United States territory—a move widely seen as a violation of international law. Merely declaring a foreign territory to be one’s own, however, cannot create a legitimate right of self-defense in relation to that territory. This declaration could be a “testing the water” exercise for a possible usage of a Tactical Nuclear Battlefield Weapon against Iran. Article 51 of the UN Charter states that a state can use necessary and proportionate force to expel an invader from its sovereign land. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in its 1996 Advisory Opinion that the threat or use of nuclear weapons must strictly comply with the rules of armed conflict. Some experts with a military background are predicting that this speech is intentional. It will clear the way for the immediate use of tactical nuclear battlefield weapons to open up the Strait of Hormuz for all. Analysts suggest that designating the strait as U.S. territory could be a legal pretext for using tactical nuclear weapons to reopen the waterway.
The second opinion is more nuanced and qualified. It predicts that use of any nuclear weapon, even a small tactical one, would break an 80-year-old norm. A unilateral U.S. declaration of the Strait of Hormuz as U.S. territory does not change its legal status under international law. The strait is a critical international waterway, and the right of “transit passage” for all nations is protected under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The global consensus is that this would set a dangerous precedent, potentially providing other nations, such as Russia, with a justification for using tactical nuclear weapons in their own conflicts. Experts warn that lowering the threshold for nuclear use would undermine global stability and fuel a new arms race.
There is widespread concern that the use of even a tactical nuclear weapon would create a dangerous precedent. Other nuclear-armed states, including Russia, might invoke such an incident to justify the use of tactical nuclear weapons in their own conflicts. Lowering the threshold for nuclear use would therefore undermine international stability, weaken the global non-proliferation regime, and potentially fuel a new nuclear arms race. Although a one-kiloton nuclear weapon might be described as “limited,” Iran and its allies would almost certainly regard its use as an exceptionally grave attack. It could trigger a much wider conflict and begin an escalatory process that none of the parties could reliably control.